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I. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3102(3)0), -102(4); 78A-4-103(2)U).
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 1

A.

Morton Loans $491,000 to Higginson.
1.

On January 24, 2006, Kraig T. Higginson ("Higginson") sent wire

instructions for James E. Morton ("Morton") to wire $491,000 into Higginson's account.
See Higginson Email (01/24/06), (R. 165).

2.

That same day, Morton sent instructions to his bank to wire the money to

Higginson. See Wire Instructions, (R. 168).
3.

The following day, January 25, 2006, $491,000 was wired from Morton's

account to Higginson's. See Bank Stmt., (R. 170-76).
8.

Higginson Confirms His Obligation to Morton.
4.

On December 14, 2006, Higginson sent an email to Morton stating that he

"need[s] to get 'squared up' on the$ I owe you. I haven't forgotten ... and you will get
paid." Higginson Email (12/14/06), (R. 178).

1

Appellants' statement of facts contains immaterial issues that are included solely
to prejudice the Court. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 3, ,r 15 ("[Morton] divorced his wife and ...
began to live a lavish lifestyle .... "). These issues are largely untrue, and are not relevant
to this appeal or the underlying case. They should be stricken by the Court, or not
considered in the Court's decision.

1
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5.

On April 6, 2008, Morton began inquiring about the"+/- $SOOK" he had

"loaned [Higginson] a couple of years ago to close on his house." See Morton Email
(04/06/08), (R. 181 ).
6.

On April 10, 2008, Higginson sent an email to Morton stating:

~

Things are going great. Should be able to get the stock up nicely soon, and
get you paid back. You were truly a life saver this past year. Thanks for
the patience. I have asked Stan Kimball to prepare a Note ... just in case I
get run over by a bus ... you would get paid.
Higginson Email (04/10/08) (holding in original; underline added), (R. 190).
7.

On September 24, 2008, Morton sent an email to defendant Mark Burdge

("Burdge"), Higginson's assistant, regarding paperwork for the loan:
As far as the loan to Kraig goes, Stan Kimball has asked me to put it in the
form of a demand note. The 491K was transferred by to [sic] Kraig by me
on 11/24/06. I agreed to have it accrue interest at 5%, compounding
annually. If for any reason the terms are not acceptable to Kraig, let me
know and we'll go back to the drawing board.
Morton Email (09/24/08), (R. 192-93).
VD

8.

Burdge responded to Morton's email as follows:

[C]an I get the details of the loan that Kraig owes you? I'm trying to tidy up
his accounting and he indicated he has an outstanding obligation to you in
excess of $500,000.00. I need dates, interest, amount advanced etc. and any
other loan documents or memos if you have them.
Burdge Email (09/24/08) ( emphasis added), (R. 192).

9.

Higginson executed a Demand Note dated December 31, 2008, by which he

acknowledged that (i) the Demand Note "originated on January 24, 2006" and (ii) he was
required to repay $491,000 to Morton upon demand with 5% interest annually. See
VJ)

Demand Note, Add.
2
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I 0.

Higginson also agreed in the Demand Note that he would be liable for all

costs, including attorneys' fees, associated with a default in repayment. See id.
C.

Morton Passes Away, and Higginson Reneges on His Promise.
11.

Approximately five months later, in May 2009, Morton passed away.

Carmichael Dec. 1 IO (R. 228).
12.

On January 28, 2013, Megan (Morton) Moss ("Megan") sent an email to

Higginson. In the email, Megan identified herself as Morton's daughter and asked to talk
to Higginson about the Demand Note. See Megan Email (01/28/13), (R. 199).
13.

After over 18 months of Megan trying to collect from Higginson, she sent

another email to Higginson allowing him one more chance to make good on his promise
before involving lawyers to collect on the Demand Note. See Megan Email (07 /22/14 ),
(R. 201-02).

14.

When Higginson again failed to repay the Demand Note, the lawyers for

the Estate of James E. Morton (the "Estate") sent a letter to Higginson demanding
payment. See Johnson Ltr. (09/05/14 ), (R. 195-97).
15.

Higginson has never repaid the principal or interest owing under the

Demand Note. Carmichael Dec. 1 12 (R. 228).

III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Prior to Morton's death, he made a loan to Higginson in the amount of $491,000.
The loan was memorialized by a Demand Note executed by Higginson on December 31,
2008, and bore interest at a rate of 5% annually. Higginson also sent multiple emails to

3
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Morton acknowledging his debt and promising that Morton would be repaid even if
fJi)

Higginson were "run over by a bus."
Approximately five months after Higginson executed the Demand Note, Morton
passed away.
Megan assumed an active role in managing her late father's Estate. In that role,
she contacted Higginson to seek repayment of the Demand Note, but Higginson only
delayed. Finally, after 18 months of delay from Higginson, the Estate was forced to hire
attorneys to seek collection. But Higginson continued to deny payment-despite making
use of the money. Indeed, Higginson began claiming that Morton had said things before
he passed away that were totally inconsistent with emails that were later produced.
After cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered an order and
judgment requiring Higginson to repay the Demand Note, with interest, as promised. But
Higginson still refuses to pay.

\@

Now, Higginson raises new arguments on appeal that were never raised with the
trial court. Higginson also fails to contest an independent ground for the trial court's
ruling, which makes his appeal facially defective.

~

The fact of the matter is that Higginson borrowed nearly half a million dollars
from Morton and confirmed his obligation while Morton was alive, but has sought to
avoid repayment since Morton died. He is now attempting to find a loophole in the law
whereby he can sign a contract but avoid repayment if he never delivers the original of
the contract to the lender. The trial court was not impressed with Higginson' s argument
or his unsupported claims to what Morton allegedly said, and neither should this Court
4
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be. The ruling of the trial court should be affirmed, and Higginson should be forced to
make good on his debt.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The Appeal Fails Because It Does Not Address Both Independent Grounds
for the Trial Court's Decision.

~

Appellants' argument fails on its face because they failed to appeal both of the
independent grounds used by the trial court to support its decision. Appellate courts in
Utah will not reverse a ruling if both alternative grounds are not appealed:
"This court will not reverse a ruling of the [district] court that rests on
independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges only one of
those grounds." Salt Lake County v. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp.,
2013 UT App 30, ,r 28,297 P.3d 38; see also Republic Outdoor Adver., LC
v. Utah Dep 't of Transp., 2011 UT App 198, ,r 32, 25 8 P .3 d 619 (declining
to consider a challenge to an alternative basis for the court's grant of
summary judgment where appellant failed to adequately challenge an
independent basis for the court's ruling).

Simmons Media Grp., LLC v. Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, ,r 32,335 P.3d 885, 89293 (brackets in original). In this case, the trial court granted Morton's summary judgment
motion and denied Higginson's motion because it found that the Demand Note was
enforceable. Its finding rested on two alternative grounds. First, the trial court found that
the Demand Note constituted an enforceable contract that was not subject to the
requirements of UCC 3. See Order at 2-3, ,r,r 7, 14 (R. 383-84). Second, as an
independent ground, the trial court found that even if "the provisions of UCC 3 were
imposed on the Estate's enforcement of the Demand Note against Higginson, ... the
~

5
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Estate has substantially complied with those provisions." Id. at 3, ii 15 (R. 384). 2
~

Therefore, under Simmons Media, Appellants needed to appeal both independent grounds
in order for this Court to issue a ruling. But they did not; they only argued the UCC 3
issue that, notably, was not even the trial court's primary basis for its decision. Therefore,
this appeal fails.

B.

This Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's Ruling Under Contract Law.

The primary basis for the trial court's ruling was that the Demand Note was an
enforceable contract between Morton and Higginson. See Order at 2-3, ilil 7, 14 (R. 38384 ). Morton's claim for breach of contract requires proof of the well-known elements of
"(1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract
by the other party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, iJ 14, 20
~

P.3d 388, 392. In this case, the trial court found, based on undisputed evidence, that each
of these elements was met. See Order at 2, ilil 1-5 (R. 383). However, Appellants never

~

dispute this finding in their brief. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's
decision.
C.

The Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's Ruling Under the Alternative
Equitable Causes of Action.

Morton pied claims under equitable causes of action in addition to his contractual
claims against Higginson. See Am. Compl. (R. 59-62). The trial court did not issue

2

~

See also Tr. at 33: 15-23 (R. 548) ("The Court finds that there's an enforceable
contract, that it's a contract case, that the emails authenticate the demand note .... I'm
not finding that the requirements of UCC 3 are imposed but I do find that there is
substantial compliance with those, even assuming they were applicable.").

6
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specific findings on these equitable claims because it had already granted summary
judgment on the breach of contract claim. See Order at 3 (R. 384). However, the
equitable theories provide this Court with an alternative ground to affirm the trial court's
ruling requiring Higginson to repay the money.
Higginson admitted that (i) he received "just short of $500,000" from Morton in
2006, (ii) he confirmed his intent to repay in multiple emails, and (iii) he executed "the
Demand Note at issue." See Sec. Higginson Dec. 1112, 13, 16, 18 (R. 277-79). Although
he claims he had an agreement with Morton that the loan never had to be repaid, there is
no evidence from when Morton was still alive that supports that theory. It is just
convenient talk from Higginson. Therefore, Higginson' s arguments in front of the trial
court and on appeal have centered on potential technical defects he imagines in the
Demand Note that would allow him to retain the half-million dollars with no
consequences. This cannot be allowed. If this Court finds some defect in the trial court's
decision on the breach of contract claim, this Court should still affirm the decision on the
alternative equitable claims that are apparent in the record. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,

1 IO, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161.3

3

"It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from
'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling
or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed
on by the lower court.'" Bailey, 2002 UT 58, 110 (citation omitted).

7
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Morton's claim for promissory estoppel requires proof that "[(i)] a promise is
ll

made which can reasonably be expected to induce action or forbearance and [(ii)] which
in fact induces action or forbearance from which [(iii)] a detriment is suffered." Topik v.
Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987). There can be no dispute that, in this case,

(i) Higginson made representations to Morton that the amount loaned would be repaid,

(ii) Morton transferred $491,000 to Higginson based on those representations, and
(iii) Morton has suffered damages as a result of Higginson's failure to repay the amount
as promised. Fact
~

,r,r 3-9, 15. Thus, the Estate is entitled to summary judgment on its

claim for promissory estoppel as an alternative remedy to breach of contract.
Morton's claim for unjust enrichment requires proof of (i) "a benefit conferred on
one person by another," (ii) "the conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the
benefit," and (iii) "'circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the
benefit without payment of its value."' Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & LA uto, Inc., 2000 UT

~

83, ,r 13, 12 P.3d 580, 582 (citation omitted). There can be no dispute in this case that
(i) Morton conferred a benefit on Higginson and (ii) Higginson had knowledge of the
benefit. Fact ,I,I 3-9. It is also indisputable that, given the assurances Higginson provided

~

to Morton, Higginson's retention of the $491,000 is unjust. Fact ,I,I 3-9, 15. Therefore,
the Estate is entitled to summary judgment on its claim for unjust enrichment as an
~

alternative remedy to breach of contract.

D.

Higginson 's Evidence Is Precluded by the Paro I Evidence Rule.
In an attempt to avoid payment of the Demand Note, Higginson seeks to introduce

~

various alternative theories to explain why he should not repay the $491,000 he
8
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borrowed. However, as the trial court rightly noted, the Demand Note contains an
integration clause that makes these alternative theories inadmissible. See Order at 2, if 8
(R. 383). Application of the parol evidence rule is a two-step process:
First, the court must determine whether the agreement is integrated. If the
court finds the agreement is integrated, then parol evidence may be
admitted only if the court makes a subsequent determination that the
language of the agreement is ambiguous.

Tangren Family Tr. v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, if 11, 182 P.3d 326, 330 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) (holding that trial court had improperly considered an alleged
oral condition precedent to enforcement of a written contract). In this case, the Demand
Note has a clear integration clause: "This instrument constitutes the entire agreement of
the parties .... " See Demand Note, Add. It is also completely unambiguous:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I, Kraig T. Higginson, the undersigned
("Borrower"), promises to pay to James E. Morton ("Lender"), or his
designee, the sum of Four Hundred Ninety One Thousand Dollars, together
with interest hereon at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum,
compounded annually.

Id. Based on this clear language, the trial court rightly found that the Demand Note is
unambiguous and parol evidence is inadmissible. See Order at 3, 110 (R. 384).
Higginson has not raised any argument that would indicate that the language of the
Demand Note is ambiguous. Therefore, under Tangren Family, Higginson's parol
evidence cannot be considered.
Indeed, Higginson' s argument is defeated by his own position in this case. Both at
the trial court and on appeal, Higginson argues that the Demand Note should be treated as
a negotiable instrument under UCC 3. By definition, a "negotiable instrument" is "an

9
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unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money." Utah Code Ann. § 70Ati

3-104( 1). Higginson should not be allowed to argue that the Demand Note is
simultaneously an "unconditional promise ... to pay" and a promise conditioned on
numerous, unwritten requirements. The trial court was right to focus on the unambiguous
language of the written agreement, rather than entertain Higginson' s unsupported
conditions. See Order at 3, 11 11, 17 (R. 384).

E.

4

The Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's Ruling Under UCC 3.
The trial court also granted Morton's motion for summary judgment and denied

Higginson's motion under the independent requirements of UCC 3. See Order at 3, 1 15
(R. 384). Appellants dedicate their entire brief to disputing this holding, but each of their

arguments fails.

1.

Higginson's Argument Regarding "Nonissuance" Was Not Preserved,
Is Immaterial, and Is Contrary to Law.

Appellants' begin their argument by claiming, without citation, that "the Trial
Court ... concluded Higginson issued the Demand Note to Morton." Aplt. Br. at 7.
However, the trial court never made such a specific finding in its Order. Therefore,
~

Appellants' argument must be understood as claiming that the trial court's finding that all
UCC 3 requirements were "substantially complied with" includes a finding of issuance.
See Order at 3,, 15 (R. 384). This holding obviously relates solely to the trial court's
ruling on UCC 3 as opposed to the independent ruling based on contract law. As a result,

4

~

Even if the Court looked to Higginson' s theories, it would find that there is no
evidence from when Morton was alive that supports Higginson' s claims.

10
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Appellants' argument does nothing to undermine the trial court's independent decision
based on contract law, or the alternative means of affirmance under the equitable
theories, and Higginson' s appeal must fail. See above.
Even if this Court focuses on the UCC 3 issue, however, Appellants' argument is
still incorrect. When Appellants argued this issue before the trial court, they did not
provide any case law. (R. 273.) Nor did they argue that the lack of issuance demonstrated
a lack of intent to repay. (Id.) Instead, before the trial court Appellants argued the strict
position that the lack of issuance made the instrument invalid under the UCC. (Id.) In
response, Morton explained the availability of constructive issuance and cited the

Johnson and Thatcher cases on which Higginson now relies. (See R. 297-99. )5 Despite
Appellants' arguments below, they now concede the possibility of constructive issuance
and the delivery of a copy of the Demand Note to Morton, but they attempt to recast their
argument for appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 9 ("delivery may be actual or constructive"). But
5

While the Negotiable Instruments Law expressly provides that every
contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until
delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto, such
provision is merely a legislative enactment of the common-law rule, and
was not intended to abrogate or impair other well-recognized rules by
which delivery would be implied, either from authority actually conferred
by the maker or holder upon an agent, or from conduct which should estop
them from claiming that they had not delivered or authorized the delivery
of the instrument. ... Such delivery may be actual, or constructive, such as
written evidence of the transfer intending thereby to vest the thing itself in
prresenti in the assignee, but it is not essential that the delivery shall be
directly to the assignee.

Johnson v. Beickey, 64 Utah 43, 46,228 P. 189, 191 (1924) (citation omitted; emphases
added) (quoted at R. 298).

11
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because Appellants never raised their current claim that lack of issuance demonstrates
lack of intent before the trial court, they should not be allowed to raise it now. See

Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154, ,r,r 3-8, 330 P.3d 762, 766 (refusing to consider
argument of quasi-estoppel appeal when only argument in trial court was oral
vb

agreement). 6
Appellants' argument also fails on the merits. Appellants argue boldly that "[ t]he
Demand Note never became an issue until Morton died and his daughters ... sought
repayment." Aplt. Br. at 10. This is completely wrong. Higginson has already admitted
that he exchanged emails with Morton while Morton was alive in which Morton sought
repayment and Higginson confirmed his obligation:

o "[N]eed to get 'squared up' on the$ I owe you. I haven't forgotten ... and you
will get paid." Fact ,r 4.

o Morton inquiring about the"+/- $SOOK" that he had "loaned [Higginson] a
couple of years ago." Fact if 5.

o Higginson stating he would "get [Morton] paid back. You truly were a life
saver this past year.... I have asked Stan Kimball to prepare a Note ... just in
case I get run over by a bus ... you would get paid." Fact if 6.
Thus, the undisputed evidence before the trial court was that, when Morton was still
alive, he and Higginson both understood that the Demand Note should be repaid.
Higginson' s new theories are completely unsupported. Therefore, even if Higginson had
VP

raised this argument below, the trial court would have been justified in finding that it is

6

Appellants only cite to their general notice of appeal when attempting to
demonstrate preservation of issues. See Aplt. Br. at vii.
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contrary to the undisputed evidence that Higginson confirmed his obligation to Morton
while Morton was still alive.
Finally, Higginson's theory about the Demand Note being a tax formality has no
support in evidence from when Morton was alive, and is contrary to the unambiguous
terms of the Demand Note requiring repayment. See Aplt. Br. at 9. Higginson's postmortem theories that absolve him of his obligations should not be credited.

2.

Higginson's Argument Regarding Conditions Precedent Was Not
Preserved and Is Contrary to Law.

Appellants also argue that Higginson was never required to repay the Demand
Note because his payment was conditioned on him being able to sell his Raser stock for
$500 million-more than 1,000 times the amount owed. Aplt. Br. at 10-14, Fact ,r 16. In
support of this extraordinary argument, Higginson reaches back as much as 93 years to
find cases that he claims support his position. Id. Thankfully, however, Utah law has not
been silent on this issue for that long. The most recent controlling case from Utah on this
issue forecloses Higginson's argument. See Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin,
2011 UT 64, 266 P.3d 814. In Young Living, one party to an integrated contract was
seeking to avoid the requirements of the contract by claiming through affidavit that a
collateral, oral agreement established conditions precedent that had never been satisfied.
Id. at if15, 13. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Utah Supreme Court all
rejected that argument. Id. at 1 1. The decision cites to Tangren Family (quoted above)
for the proposition that "parol evidence of a side agreement" is inadmissible against an
integrated contract. Id. at ,I 13; see also Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d

13
88334629.2 0035959-0000 lDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

746, 750 (Utah 1983) (rejecting parol evidence of alleged condition); MediaNews Grp.,
@

Inc. v. McCarthey, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1227 (D. Utah 2006) (rejecting Higginson-style
parol evidence under Utah law). The trial court was right to reject Higginson's attempt to
eviscerate the Demand Note through his own self-serving affidavit. 7
Higginson also failed to preserve this argument below. Although Higginson
referenced an alleged condition related to his Raser stock, he did so without citing any
legal support and for a different reason than he presents now. (R. 272.) When presented
to the trial court, Higginson only argued that his claim of a collateral agreement created

t@

an issue of fact for which he was entitled to a presumption. (Id.) He never argued that his
collateral agreement was an exception to the parol evidence rule. Therefore, this version
of his argument should not be considered on appeal. See Wohnoutka, 2014 UT App 154,

,i,r 3-8.
3.

Higginson's Argument Regarding Mutual Mistake Was Nof Preserved
and Is Not Factually Supported.

Appellants argue that Higginson' s parol evidence of an alleged collateral
agreement with Morton should be admitted because of a mutual mistake. Aplt. Br. at

7

&a

~

It appears Higginson' s case law is also best understood as addressing a lack of
consideration that makes the contract unenforceable rather than a condition within an
enforceable contract. See, e.g., Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance &
Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 1988) (characterizing F.MA Fin. Corp. v. Hansen
Dairy, Inc., 617 P .2d 327 (Utah 1980), as a being based on failure of consideration);
Nuttall v. Berntson, 83 Utah 535, 30 P.2d 738, 741 (1934) ("[N]o valid and effective
contract ever existed." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In this case,
Higginson admits that he received the money under the Demand Note, so there can be no
claim of failure of consideration. See Sec. Higginson Dec. ,r 12 (R. 277).
14
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14-15. Again, this argument was never presented to the trial court. Therefore, Higginson
may not raise it on appeal. See Wohnoutka, 2014 UT App 154, ,r,I 3-8.
The argument is also not factually supported. Under Higginson' s legal citations,
parol evidence is permissible "'when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their
bargain.'" Aplt Br. at 15 (emphases added) (quoting W. One Tr. Co. v. Morrison, 861
P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). The West One Trust case goes on to say that
mutual mistake must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. However, in
this case, Higginson has only shown evidence of an alleged unilateral mistake; he claims
that "Higginson [(not Morton)] never intended the Demand Note to be enforceable."
Aplt. Br. at 15. The only alleged evidence he provides related to Morton's intent comes
from Higgingon' s self-serving affidavit that Morton allegedly said he needed the Demand
Note signed for tax purposes and that Higginson should "not worry about it." Id. But the
allegation that Morton wanted a written Demand Note associated with the uncontested
transfer of $491,000 does not show by clear and convincing evidence that Morton
understood the transfer to be subject to any conditions. Burningham v. Westgate Resorts,

Ltd., 2013 UT App 244, ,r 15, 317 P.3d 445, 449 ("The declaration provides evidence
only of unilateral mistake by Westgate, not the mutual mistake required to establish
grounds for equitable rescission of the Agreement."). The lack of a mistake is also shown
by Morton's attempt to collect the loan during his lifetime. See, e.g., Fact ,r,I 5, 7. Thus,
Higginson cannot escape the parol evidence rule, and the Demand Note is enforceable
according to its terms.
15
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4.

Higginson 's Argument Regarding Presentment Fails.

Oddly, Appellants have argued that Morton cannot enforce the Demand Note for
contradictory reasons: (i) because Higginson never gave the original to Morton and
(ii) because Morton cannot present the original to Higginson. Compare Aplt. Br. at 17
with id. at 16-19. When this issue was first argued below, the Estate believed it possessed

an original Demand Note and Higginson argued that presentment was necessary to ensure
~

that the original had not been altered or negotiated to a third party. Higginson Opp. to
MSJ (R. 152); Morton Disc. Resp. (R. 134-35). However, Higginson later submitted an
affidavit testifying that he had never delivered the original to Morton, showing that his
original argument was completely disingenuous. Sec. Higginson Dec. 1 18 (R. 279).
Now, despite having already clarified this issue before the trial court, Higginson again
argues that presentment of the original Demand Note is necessary even though he never
provided the original to Morton. Aplt. Br. at 9 (Higginson "never delivered the original

~

Demand Note to Morton"); id. at 17 ("The Morton Estate failed to present the original
Demand Note .... "). Even worse, Higginson still claims to be concerned that Morton
altered the terms of the Demand Note that Higginson still retains. Id. at 17 ("The same
concerns exist in the present case."). This argument only highlights Higginson's intent to
establish a loophole whereby he can sign a contract, receive $491,000, and then avoid
any consequences through a twisted interpretation of the UCC. This Court should follow
the trial court in denying Higginson' s attempt.
In addition, Higginson overstates his legal position. First, he admits that
presentment can be satisfied with "substantial compliance," but fails to recognize the
16
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application to this case. Id. at 16. This case presents a prime circumstance for allowance
of substantial compliance. The Court has before it the original parties, the borrower
maintains possession of the original note, there is no dispute that the money was paid,
and the only reason presentment cannot be completed is because the borrower
(Higginson) prevented it. The Court should be assured that justice will be served in this
case if substantial compliance is allowed.
Finally, Higginson 's legal support for requiring strict compliance with
presentment, in addition to being from outside of Utah, is easily distinguished. See id. at
16-17. Each of his cases relates to agreements that expressly required presentment of the

~

original document in order to receive funds. See Bisker v. NationsBank, N.A., 686 A.2d
561,566 (D.C. 1996); Brul v. MidAmerican Bank & Tr. Co., 820 F. Supp. 1311, 1312 (D.
Kan. 1993); Am. Coleman Co. v. lntrawest Bank ofSouthglenn, N.A., 887 F.2d 1382,
1388 (10th Cir. 1989). There is no such requirement in the Demand Note. Therefore,
Higginson 's impossible demand for presentment of an original document that he never

~

provided should be denied. 8

Gw
8

Higginson also summarizes other problems with his position that were argued
below. See Aplt. Agr. at 16-19 (re cases interpreting UCC 5 rather than UCC 3;
availability of lost note presentment under UCC 3; failure of "show-me-the-note"
argument; Higginson's waiver). Morton incorporates those arguments by reference.
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F.

Morton's Claims Are Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Appellants' final argument is that each of Morton's claims is barred by the statute
of limitations. Aplt. Br. at 19-25. However, Higginson miscalculates the relevant time
periods and ignores equitable considerations.
Higginson admits that the statutes of limitations do not begin running until "'the
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action."' Id. at 20 (quoting
~

Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 133, 44 P.3d 742). But Higginson then fails to properly
identify when the last event occurred. Even when relying on the cases provided by

~

Higginson, it is clear that the last event necessary to trigger the statute of limitations was
when Morton was harmed. 9 That harm occurred when Higginson refused to pay, not
when Morton originally made the loan or when Higginson persuaded Megan to delay in
demanding payment. At the time the loan was made, Morton had simply traded money
for a Demand Note, and had no reason to seek judicial involvement. It was not until

vj

Higginson denied the demand for payment in 2014 that Morton (who was represented by

Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ,r 35,989 P.2d 1077, 1088
(promissory estoppel: '"loss to the plaintiff" (citation omitted)); Am. Towers Owners
Ass 'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996) (unjust enrichment:
'"retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable"' (citation omitted)); Fibro Tr., Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, ,r 20,
974 P.2d 288, 296 (conversion: '"deprived of its use"' (citation omitted)); Armed Forces
Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ,r 16, 70 P.3d 35 (fraud: "'to that party's injury and
damage"' (citation omitted)); Walker v. Anderson-Oliver Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2013 UT
App 202, ~ 18, 309 P.3d 267, 273 (tortious interference: "'injury to the plaintiff"
(citation omitted)).
9

18
\,jfV

88334629.2 0035959-00001

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Estate at that time) was harmed. Fact ilil 14-15. Therefore, the statutes of limitations
all started running in 2014, and Morton's action filed in April 2015 was timely.

GiJ

In addition, Appellants' argument ignores their own actions in concealing the facts
in this case. Utah allpws for equitable tolling of statutes of limitations in two
circumstances:
"( 1) where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because
of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct, and (2) where the
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general
rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the
defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action."

Helfrich v. Adams, 2013 UT App 37, iJ 9, 299 P.3d 2, 6 (citation omitted). In this case,
Higginson confirmed his obligation to Morton (while he was alive), then strung Megan
along as the representative of the Estate for another year and a half. Fact ilil 4, 6, 8-10,
12-15. If Higginson believed he was never obligated to repay, then his actions constitute
"concealment or misleading conduct," which justifies tolling of the statutes of limitations.
In addition, this case "presents exceptional circumstances" that justify equitable
tolling. Since 2009, the Estate has been operating under a disadvantage given Morton's
death and Megan's need to administer the Estate from the cold record. If necessary, the
Court should apply equitable tolling under these circumstances so Higginson is not left
with a $500,000 windfall from Morton's death.

G.

Morton Is Entitled to His Attorneys' Fees on Appeal.
The Demand Note expressly provides that Higginson "agrees to pay all costs and

expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, in the event of a default under this Note."

See Demand Note, Add. The trial court awarded Morton his attorneys' fees, and
19
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Higginson has not contested that award on appeal. See Order at 4 (R. 385); Am.
(j)

Judgment (R. 451 ). This Court should similarly award Morton his attorneys' fees and
costs associated with this appeal.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the holding of the trial court
granting summary judgment to Morton and denying Higginson' s cross-motion. This
Court should also award Morton his attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.
DATED: September 28, 2016.
STOEL RIVES LLP

Rich~:ioimsc;n
D. Matthew Moscon
Landon A. Allred
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE to be sent via first class
~

mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stephen Quesenberry (8073)
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY, LLC
4626 North 300 West, Suite 300
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 362-3681
steve@kittsgroup.com

~

vj

21
88334629.2 0035959-00001

v1'

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Order of the Court is stated below:
At the di.r:_e~tio1(q1-:.
Dated: December 29, 2015
04:33:31 PM
ROYA~'fw@sef~\
District
1
by
\
c::-:.;..{fyLr· '.' ...

Cow.f.-®.iM
REBECtA..1!Ai$A~
"!.•

Isl

"''"''"'

District Court Clerk

Richard H. Johnson II ( 1723)
D. Matthew Moscon ( 694 7)
Landon A. Allred (12428)
STOEL RIVES LLP
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-4904
Telephone: (801) 328-3131
rhjohnson@stoel.com
dmmoscon@stoel.com
laallred@stoel.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACQUELYNN D. CARMICHAEL and
MEGAN M. MOSS, as personal
representatives of THE ESTATE OF
JAMES E. MORTON,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
TO BOTH DEFENDANTS AND
JUDGMENT AGAINST KRAIG T.
HIGGINSON
Civil No. 140907046

V.

KRAIG T. HIGGINSON, an individual;
and MARK BURDGE, an individual,

The Honorable Royal I. Hansen

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed

ti

by plaintiffs Jacquelynn D. Carmichael and Megan M. Moss as personal representatives
of The Estate (the "Estate") of James E. Morton ("Morton"); and (ii) the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by defendants Kraig Higginson ("Higginson") and Mark
Burdge ("Burdge") (together, "Defendants"). A hearing on both motions was held before
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the Court on November 19, 2015. The Estate was represented by Landon Allred of the
law firm Stoel Rives LLP, and the Defendants were represented by Evan Schmutz of the
law firm Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.
Order on Summary Judgment Motions
Having reviewed the written materials submitted by counsel for all parties, having
heard and considered counsels' arguments, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court
hereby enters the following order and provides a brief statement of the grounds for the
order pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
The Courts finds that the following facts are undisputed:
1. Higginson and Morton entered into a contract (the "Demand Note").
2. The Demand Note requires Higginson to pay Morton $491,000 plus 5
percent interest annually calculated from January 24, 2006 until the
amount is repaid.
3. Morton performed his obligation under the Demand Note by delivering
$491,000 to Higginson, which Higginson received.
4. After Morton's death, Morton's Estate caused a letter to be sent to
Higginson on September 5, 2014 demanding repayment in full and
providing a copy of the Demand Note.
5. Higginson refused to repay the Demand Note.
6. The Estate was damaged as a result.
Based on these undisputed facts, and the additional information provided by the
parties, the Court concludes as follows:
7. The Demand Note is an enforceable contract between Higginson and
Morton.
8. The Demand Note contains a valid integration clause indicating that it
represents the entire agreement between Morton and Higginson.
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9. The Demand Note contains no reference to any conditions that would
excuse repayment by Higginson.
10. The language in the Demand Note is unambiguous.
11. The Court will not consider parol evidence in light of the integration
clause and the clear language of the Demand Note.

,.Ji}

12. The Demand Note requires Higginson to pay all of Morton's "costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, in the event of a default
under this Note."
13. The Estate brought its claim against Higginson within the statute of
limitations applicable to written contracts.
14. The provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code - Negotiable
Instruments (Utah§§ 70A-3-101, et seq.) ("UCC 3") are not imposed on
the Demand Note.
15. If the provisions ofUCC 3 were imposed on the Estate's enforcement of
the Demand Note against Higginson, the Court finds that the Estate has
substantially complied with those provisions. ·
16. The evidence supporting the Estate's claim for breach of contract has been
adequately supported.
17. The hypothetical issues raised by Higginson do not establish any disputed
issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment.
THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
the Estate is GRANTED against Higginson on the breach of contract claim and
Higginson is bound to perform his obligations to the Estate under the Demand Note.
Because the Court has granted summary judgment to the Estate on its breach of
contract claim, and because the other causes of action pled by the Estate were pied in the
alternative, the Court does not need to reach those claims on their merits and deems them
MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
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Defendants is DENIED.

Judgment Against Defendant Kraig T. Higginson
Given that all claims in this case have been resolved by the above Order, IT IS
XL

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that The Estate of James E. Morton (the
"Estate") is awarded a judgment against defendant Kraig T. Higginson in the amount of
$833,860.39 as of December 1, 2015, plus$ I 14.23 per diem until the date judgment is
entered, together with post-judgment interest at the statutory rate from the date judgment
is entered until the date the judgment is paid. It is further ordered that this judgment shall
be augmented in the amount of the Estate's fees and costs, including attorney's fees,
expended in obtaining and enforcing this Judgment as shall be established by affidavit or
declaration by or on behalf of the Estate.

***

Pursuant to URCP 10 the Court's signature appears at the top of the first page

***

Approved as to form:

Evan Schmutz
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of December, 2015, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO BOTH

DEFENDANTS AND IBDGMENT AGAINST KRAIG T. HIGGINSON to be served
by first class mail and email on the following:

Evan A. Schmutz
Mark R. Nelson
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
3301 North Thanksgiving Way, Suite 400
Lehi, Utah 84043
eschumtz@djplaw.com
mnelson@diplaw.com

Isl Robin Noss
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: January 27, 2016
At the dj(_ecti~~tqf,:_
02:27:52 PM
ROYAf,'iI(~SefN\
District Ccit,H!®.gge · ~
by
\ .-.:!,:p,<f·' . /
1

Isl

REBECC1\.:EA}XilAU
District Court Clerk

Richard H. Johnson II ( 1723)
D. Matthew Moscon (6947)
Landon A. Allred ( 12428)
Stoel Rives LLP
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-4904
Telephone: (801) 328-3131
rhjohnson@stoel.com
dmmoscon@stoel.com
laallred@stoel.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JACQUELYNN D. Carmichael and
Megan M. Moss, as personal
representatives of THE ESTATE OF
JAMES E. MORTON,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED JUDGMENT AGAINST
KRAIG T. HIGGINSON
Civil No. 140907046
The Honorable Royal I. Hansen

V.

KRAIG T. HIGGINSON, an individual;
and MARK BURDGE, an individual,
Defendants.
Before the Court is the Order re Summary Judgment as to Both Defendants and

Judgment Against Kraig T. Higginson dated December 29, 2015 (the "Order and Judgment");
the Rule 60(a) Motion dated January 4, 2016 (the "Rule 60 Motion"); Motion/or Entry of

Judgment re Attorneys Fees dated January 11, 2016 (''Motion for Attorney Fees) along with a
supporting declaration; and the Stipulated Motion for Entry ofAmended Judgment. For the
reasons stated in these filings, and for good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED

~
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AND DECREED that the Estate of James E. Morton (the "Estate") is awarded a judgment
against defendant Kraig T. Higginson ("Higginson") in the amount of $794,247.27 as of
December 1, 2015, plus $104.34 per diem until the date judgment is entered, together with postjudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date judgment is entered until the date the
judgment is paid. The Estate is also awarded judgment against Higginson in the amount of
$24,777.00 for attorneys fees and $1,781.21 for costs associated with obtaining this judgment.
The amounts in this Amended Judgment replace the amounts awarded in the Order and
Judgment dated December 29, 2015. All other aspects of the Order and Judgment remain in
force. This Amended Judgment represents a final judgment of the Court and no further action is
necessary. By stipulating to entry of this Amended Judgment, Higginson does not waive any
rights to appeal either the Order and Judgment or the Amended Judgment.
The Rule 60 Motion and the Motion for Attorneys Fees are hereby DENIED AS MOOT.

*** Pursuant to URCP 10 the Court's signature appears at the top of the first page***
Approved as to form while reserving all rights for appeal:
Isl Mark R. Nelson (with permission)
Evan Schmutz
Mark R. Nelson
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on this 26th day of January, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT AGAINST KRAIG T. HIGGINSON to be served by

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00451

ECF filing on the following:

Evan A. Schmutz
Mark R. Nelson
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
3301 North Thanksgiving Way, Suite 400
Lehi, Utah 84043
eschmutz@djplaw.com
mnelson@djplaw.com

Isl Robin Noss
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